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The meaning of accuracy and culture, and the rise of the machine 
in interpreting and translation. A conversation between Sandra 
Hale and Anthony Liddicoat 
 
Hale: Maybe I should start by saying that the terms ‘translation’ and ‘culture’ are very 
complex and multifaceted and may mean different things in different contexts and settings. 
Let me start with the term ‘translation’. There is the major distinction between written 
translation and oral translation (Interpreting). I would like to concentrate on interpreting, as 
that is my main area of expertise.  
Within Interpreting there are also many different types, which will in turn determine what an 
interpreter is expected to do and how interpreting tasks are approached. This is very much 
related to Skopos theory (Vermeer, 1978), where the skopos or the purpose of the 
‘translation’ or ‘interpreting task’ will determine what accuracy means and how it is achieved 
and how culture will relate to achieving such level of accuracy. For example, conference 
interpreters concentrate on propositional accuracy, generally striving to improve on the 
delivery of the speaker by omitting repetitions, backtrackings, hesitations, mistakes, etc – 
which are not important to the purpose of the speech being interpreted. Such editing will 
make for a more enjoyable conference for the delegates who are listening just to two people 
for the whole conference – the two interpreters.  
On the other extreme, all those extra linguistic features are of utmost importance in court 
interpreting, where the witnesses are assessed based not only on what they say but also on 
how they say it (Berk-Selignson, 1990; Hale, 2004). In court interpreting, therefore, 
interpreters strive to achieve accuracy of content and manner. This requirement must not be 
confused with a ‘verbatim’, ‘literal’ or ‘word for word’ translation. The way I approach 
accuracy as an interpreter myself and as an educator of interpreters, is by looking at the task 
as a pragmatic reconstruction of the original (House, 1977).  
 
Liddicoat: I agree that we are dealing with very complex terms here and in this discussion 
we’ll be talking across aspects of translation because my own area of interest has been much 
more in written translation than oral translation so some of the emphases will be a bit 
different just because of that. I’d also like to add ‘language’ to your list of complex terms as I 
think we often risk over simplifying what language is and focus more on it as code (grammar 
and vocabulary) rather than also seeing it as a meaning-making system. I would say that ideas 
such as ‘verbatim’, ‘literal’ or ‘word for word’ translation reflect such an oversimplified 
version of language where the code gets privileged over the complexity of meanings, so like 
you I would want to move beyond such views in looking at the idea of accuracy, which for 
me is also a complex term.  
The idea of accuracy is one where there are quite different possibilities for determining what 
it means for a translation to be ‘accurate’ and the idea of accuracy has been a key area of 
debate in the linguistically based scholarship of translation. If we start to think about what 
makes a translation accurate, we need to move beyond a narrowly language-focused view of 
what a message is. This is where your idea of a pragmatic reconstruction of the original 
becomes a very powerful idea but also a complex one. In dealing with pragmatics, we need to 
bear in mind that pragmatics is the area of language in which language and culture most 
closely interrelate in creating meanings, but not the only area.  
In a paper I wrote a couple of years ago (Liddicoat, 2009) I argue that this interaction 
between language and culture is potentially present at all levels of linguistic communication 
from the macro-level things like the ways assumed shared knowledge shapes how we speak 
and write to the very micro-level of linguistic forms. The problem that faces the translator or 
the interpreter is the need to recognize when something other than language forms influence 
what is being communicated. David Katan (2004) puts this quite nicely when he says that the 
translator needs to attend both to the explicitly expressed and the implicitly expressed. The 
explicitly expressed is relatively easy to identify, even if it can be hard to translate into 
another language. The implicitly expressed is often a lot harder to notice, if we are not used 
to looking for it and can be missed in translation. The implicitly expressed can even influence 
very basic levels of communication, for example the comparative level of politeness found 
between requests such as ouvrez la fenetre s’il vous plait and open the window please in 
which the French is appropriately polite in situations where the English is not. This is a quite 
tangible example, but sometimes the complexity of the implicitly expressed can be much 
harder to identify. 
 
Hale: Yes, I totally agree with everything you said above. As Crystal said, the overarching 
aim in translation is “… to convey the effect of what would happen if the same situation 
arose in the other language”. (Crystal and Jiang 2013). That aim will require many changes at 
the word and sentence levels in order to be accurate at the discourse/pragmatic level. So, 
accurate interpreting is for the most part very distant from the original words and structures 
used in the source language. And yes, pragmatic differences trickle down from the macro to 
the micro levels of communication, as you state above. Your example of politeness 
exemplifies the different ways languages and cultures express politeness. Unless the purpose 
of the translation is to show such differences, the translator or interpreter would change the 
utterance to match the level of politeness in order to be accurate. Another similar example 
that relates to court interpreting, is the way courtroom questions are understood and 
accurately rendered.  A common question type used in court during examination-in-chief 
(direct examination in the USA) is the modal interrogative, such as “Can you tell the court 
what happened on that day?”. Semantically, this is a question of ability, but pragmatically, it 
is an indirect speech act – an indirect polite request to tell the court what happened. When an 
interpreter is interpreting into a language for which such a question would not elicit the 
desired answer, then in order to be accurate, the interpreter will need to change it to the 
pragmatically appropriate question, which may be a direct speech act such as “Please tell the 
court what happened”, otherwise, the answer elicited by a semantically translated question 
may be “yes” or “no”. In fact I have research data showing this very result when interpreters 
interpreted at the semantic rather than the pragmatic level (Hale, 2014). This type of cross 
linguistic pragmatic difference is what Thomas (1984) calls “pragmalinguistic differences”, 
which can be addressed by interpreters as a matter of course, without the need to explain 
anything to the audience. The difficulty for interpreters arises when “sociopragmatic 
differences” (Thomas, 1984) arise. These are extra linguistic cross-cultural differences that 
may lead to communication breakdowns, such as inappropriate social behaviours, taboos, etc. 
This is when interpreters are unsure about what to do and reluctant to offer any advice for 
fear of stereotyping (Hale, 2013a).  
 
Liddicoat: It’s this level of sociopragmatics that is one of those instances where the implicitly 
expressed become less tangible and may be overlooked in translation in ways that mean that 
the translated message is not the same as the original one. This for me is where the idea of the 
translator as a mediator is an important one. There is a need to intervene in some way in the 
text that is being produced in the target language but also a need to understand what is a 
legitimate intervention. As Jull Costa (2007) notes translators need to be selective in 
determining how and when they intervene in the text and to consider how consequential a 
concept, practice, etc. is for understanding the meaning that is being conveyed. If 
sociopragmatic or other knowledge is central to understanding what is being said, then 
reluctance to intervene can obscure what is being communicated.  
 
Hale: Yes, that’s right. Again, the approach to ‘accuracy’ will depend on the type of 
translation and its purpose. And I agree that the term ‘accuracy’ is also very complex for this 
very reason, but generally, the guiding principle for interpreters would be to alert the parties 
to a potential cross cultural misunderstanding when it is caused by a cultural issue that is 
understood by the interpreter because of shared sociopragmatic knowledge which would also 
be shared by other speakers of the source language but not by those of the target language. 
These are those issues that go beyond the pragmalinguistic level and cannot be conveyed 
through a pragmatic reconstruction of the original. In translation, translators would alert the 
reader via a translator’s note or by explicitation in the body of the translation. And this leads 
me to the original point about the term ‘culture’.  Speakers of the same language can of 
course share cultural aspects with each other, but also differ culturally on many others 
depending on their background, social status, profession, education levels, religion, etc. So, it 
is risky to attribute any difference or any communication breakdown to a ‘cross-cultural 
difference’ (see Felberg & Skaaden, 2012).  
 
Liddicoat: For me, culture is one of the most difficult concepts for the languages professions 
to work with and the ways we have talked about culture, especially in language education, 
have often been really problematic. In particular, the idea of culture as national culture or of 
culture being in some way co-extensive with language are especially problematic as they 
obscure the variability that exists within all cultures. We need to move beyond seeing 
cultures as discrete, static entities and see cultures as varied, subjective and power-based 
constructions of lived experience. I also feel we need to be more skeptical about culture as 
the explanation for communication problems. Ingrid Piller (2011, p. 172) makes the point that 
“Culture is sometimes nothing more than a convenient and lazy explanation”. At the same 
time, culture is nonetheless present in communication and we need to be able to recognize it 
as consequential in shaping communication at various points. For me, this is not the same as 
saying culture is the cause of communication problems. Rather I am saying that the cultural 
frame in which we communicate shapes how and what we communicate. This idea is 
particularly significant for a translator of written texts as the reader and writer are not only 
separated from each other at the moment of reading a writing, but they are not knowingly 
involved in intercultural communication as the original writer wrote in a particular language 
to address speakers of that language and had particular assumptions about what such readers 
know and how they understand meanings communicated in their shared language. A 
translator has to make a text comprehensible for someone other than the intended reader. I 
think that the problem exists to some extent also in interpreting, although the co-presence of 
the participants in the interaction introduces different possibilities and different dynamics. In 
each case the translator needs to get a message across to a recipient who does not share the 
same meaning-making resources. 
 
Hale: Yes, in live interpreted situations, especially dialogue interpreting, the participants have 
the opportunity to ask for clarification if something is unclear or seems inappropriate, 
whereas in translation, the reader does not have that option. I have previously stated that in 
terms of accuracy translation can be seen as more ‘target reader-oriented’ and dialogue 
interpreting as more ‘source speaker-oriented’ (Hale, 2007). What I mean by that is that 
translation tends to require more explicitation to convey the intended message because of the 
reasons we discussed above. In dialogue interpreted situations, the source speakers can take 
more responsibility because they can react immediately to what was said.  
 I agree with Crystal (Crystal and Jiang 2013, p41 ) that interpreters cannot be mind readers, 
and can only go by what they understand on the surface, which is of course complemented by 
their shared knowledge with the speakers for whom they are interpreting. The more 
interpreters know about the setting, the goals of the interaction, the backgrounds and cultures 
of the speakers, and the subject matter, the better equipped they will be to understand and to 
produce an accurate rendition; but ultimately, interpreters can only be faithful to their own 
understanding of the source utterance. This is why interpreters will often ask for clarification, 
to ensure that they have understood correctly. A translator may have more trouble seeking 
such clarification, unless the author is still alive. 
 
Liddicoat: I agree with the idea that an interpreter or any other translator can only be faithful 
to their own understanding gets to the heart of the nature of human communication. 
Meanings are complex and their interpretation (I’m using this word in the hermeneutic sense 
not in the sense of oral translation) is subjective – each interpreter brings his/her own 
resources to the interpretation. For me, it is this act of interpretation that is fundamental to the 
act of translation – there needs to be an awareness that the act of reading/listening for 
translation is a process of interpreting meaning in order convey this meaning to another. This 
idea of interpretation is at the heart of the way I understand the idea of mediation as it applies 
in translation and intercultural communication more generally. 
 
Hale: Yes, and that leads me to mention the confusion surrounding the term ‘mediation’ in 
relation to Interpreting, which is sometimes used to mean ‘advocacy’, and I think these are 
very different concepts that should not be confused. In my view, there is no question about 
the fact that interpreters and translators are linguistic and cultural mediators, but I disagree 
with the suggestion that being a mediator makes the interpreter an advocate. The role of 
advocate for the minority language speaker has been proposed for community interpreters 
(see examples in Barsky, 1996; Kaufert, 1997), and research has found that many ad hoc 
interpreters act as advocates or gatekeepers, by deliberately editing the speakers’ turns in an 
attempt to ‘help’ present a better answer or to avoid wasting time (Angelelli, 2004; Davidson, 
2000), with serious implications, especially in medical or legal settings (Tebble, 2012). The 
question has been asked, why can’t an interpreter advocate for both sides? One reason is 
because that is not part of the interpreting task, but another is that if you advocate for both, 
you advocate for none – so we’re back to the original ethical requirement of impartiality. 
Professional interpreters are impartial mediators, interested in the communication process 
rather than the outcome of the interaction. Some have argued that impartiality is impossible 
and should not be expected of interpreters. For sure, interpreters are humans and they will 
form judgments, but here again, I agree with  Geertz’s comment: “I have never been 
impressed by the argument that as complete objectivity is impossible in these matters (as, of 
course, it is), one might as well let one’s sentiments run loose. .. [It] is like saying that as a 
perfectly aseptic environment is impossible, one might as well conduct surgery in a sewer” 
(Geertz, C. 1973/2000: 30). The more interpreters are aware of their own partialities and of 
their ethical obligations, the more they will be able to control how they interpret. There may 
be situations, of course, where it may be impossible for an interpreter to interpret; if there is a 
conflict of interest, that’s when interpreters can withdraw. However, if I were to interpret 
only for those I agree with, I wouldn’t be interpreting for many people! 
 
Liddicoat: It is important to keep the ideas of mediation, advocacy and gatekeeping separate 
in the way we think about the roles of interpreters and translators as I think of these as quite 
different ideas, but the fact you raise these as a group points to something I believe is a key 
problem in how we think about intercultural mediation – the overlap of mediation into many 
different domains of activity. My starting point in thinking about mediation as a linguist 
working on issues of language and culture is language as a meaning making system; and for 
me, mediation is fundamentally associated with interpretation of meanings. This is what 
separates it from the other terms. I think Gohard-Radenkovic, et al. (2004) provide a useful 
way of thinking about mediation in intercultural communication when they argue that the 
mediator is a social actor who works to give someone who does not understand the capacity 
to understand. This is a way of thinking about mediation that places meaning at the centre of 
what mediators do and allows for the possibility of disentangling mediation as an element of 
intercultural communication from other ways of understanding mediation - for example as it 
is used in dispute resolution. Advocacy is not an interpretative act in the same sense as what I 
mean by mediation here, rather it assumes an adversarial context between participants that 
needs to be resolved. This is something that lies outside the mediation of communication, 
which is the translator’s primary task.  
Gate-keeping is even more removed from the idea of interpretation and meaning making. The 
fact that these terms come together in discussions of intercultural mediation is problematic as 
it shows how terminologies can obscure different ways of thinking about and through 
questions. As language professionals we need to remain focused on mediation as a linguistic 
and communicative practice and to understand our roles and ethical responsibilities through 
this focus. At the same time, we need to recognize that this is mediational work and that there 
are complex issues of language and culture that we do need to engage with in a principled 
and mindful way. 
 
Hale – Yes, I agree with you again.   
 
Liddicoat: I think what this discussion has shown is that the issue of translators’ and 
interpreters’ agency is something that we need to give a lot of thought to. If we think of the 
translator or interpreter too narrowly as a ‘language’ specialist recasting language forms, then 
we are likely to miss the realities of the mediational process that is involved. To do so, is 
almost to reduce the translator to the role of a machine processing linguistic structures. The 
translator is an active interpreter of meanings, and of meanings that lie to some degree 
outside purely ‘linguistic’ forms. When we move the activity of interpretation to the heart of 
the translator’s work we are forced to think in different terms about what is both possible and 
desirable for translation and to recognize the sophistication of this work. In particular we 
need to recognize the human dimension of translation work and to understand the ways in 
which translators are social actors within processes of border-crossing and intercultural 
understanding.  
 
 
Hale: Saying that interpreters and translators only switch words from one language to another 
like machines shows a basic misunderstanding of the complex process of translation, as 
we’ve discussed above.  
 
Liddicoat: The human dimension is fundamental to seeing how the field of interpreting and 
translating will be understood in the future. The developments in machine translation are 
sometimes taken as eclipsing or even replacing the human interpreter and translator. With the 
advent of easily accessible translation software on mobile phones gives the appearance that 
interlingual communication is unproblematic and independent of professional expertise, 
something that is emphasised in the promotion of such software. For example, Google 
Translate’s latest upgrade claimed to be “one step closer to turning your phone into a 
universal translator and to a world where language is no longer a barrier to discovering 
information or connecting with each other” (Google 2015). That is, Google claims a reality in 
which technology has replaced the human element in cross language communication. While 
such software is undeniable useful, the emphases in discourses about such software is 
ultimately problematic as it is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the 
act of translation. Such software is based on a decoding of meaning at the level of word and 
grammar and is organized on structural principles such as collocation. What is missing here is 
the idea of the translator as an interpreter and rewriter on meanings as opposed to a simple 
decoder. Meaning is complex and is not located simply in the lexis and grammar of the 
language sued to communicate. It also lies in allusions, connotations, cultural conventions of 
language use; in the inherent heteroglossia of language as a mode of expression. This means 
that there are aspects of meaning-making that lie outside the competence of technology and 
which will not be the outcome of improved software.  
 
Hale: I am no expert on machine translation, but I know that translation memories and other 
machine translation tools should be used only as aids to human translators, not as 
replacements. Although these tools are improving, I doubt they will ever replace humans, and 
so far nothing has come anywhere near producing adequate oral interpreting for anything 
other than very simple exchanges. I must say, that many humans who call themselves 
‘translators and interpreters’ make the same mistakes as machines, translating at the word and 
sentence levels and ignoring the discourse pragmatic dimensions we have discussed so far. 
This has a lot to do with the theoretical underpinning of any translator’s and interpreter’s 
practical work, which is acquired mostly through formal education in translation and 
interpreting, which is something not everyone has had the benefit of. This leads us back to the 
argument that not all ‘bilinguals’ (another complex and loaded term) are automatically 
translators or interpreters, which is what many seem to believe.  
 
 
Liddicoat: The ultimate issue, I believe, lies in the recognition of the ways in which 
translators and interpreters must and do act as mediators between languages and cultures. The 
sorts of machine translation envisaged by Google Translate throw the onus of mediation on to 
the end user of the translated text: that is by definition on to those without access to the 
language of the source text and its cultural context of production and consumption. It can 
create an illusion of comprehension without ensuring the reality of that comprehension – or 
rather it creates of superficial comprehension of what a spoken or written text says but 
provide an interpretation of what the speaker or writer meant in producing the text. While in 
many low stakes contexts, this may not be a problem, in higher stakes contexts it is highly 
consequential. 
 
Hale: Yes, I agree, and again I stress the same argument can be used for incompetent 
interpreters and translators. I have written a lot about the damage an incompetent interpreter 
can do, which for the majority of cases, will simply go unnoticed, except in the rare cases of 
appeals or complaints (Hale, 2010; Hayes & Hale, 2010) . Many assume that all that is 
needed to ensure effective communication between two people who do not share a language 
is to have an interpreter present, regardless of their level of expertise and regardless of the 
speakers’ coherence, speed of delivery, register, etc. One example I can cite is a government 
organization’s requirement for interpreters to sign a form at the end of the interpreted 
interview certifying that the non English speaker had understood everything. It is not the 
interpreter’s role or responsibility to ensure understanding, and in any case, there is no way 
the interpreter could guarantee someone else’s understanding of what was said.  I’ve often 
argued for the need for the speakers to take much of the responsibility for adequate 
interpreting (Ozolins & Hale, 2009). This includes briefing the interpreter, making sure the 
interpreter is well qualified and well prepared, ensuring that the interpreter has adequate 
working conditions, and is allowed to intervene when needed to ask for or make clarifications 
(Hale, 2011; 2013b). Even with expert interpreters, this type of interaction is crucial. With 
machines, that is impossible. 
 
 
Liddicoat: The claims of organization such as the one cited from Google above create 
unrealistic expectations of what such software can do, especially among those who have little 
insight into or experience of cross language communication. Sometimes the consequences of 
this are highly problematic. For example, recently the Australian Department of Health 
started to use Google Translate to convey health information in a range of languages (see 
http://www.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/Content/Other+Languages-1). The 
results are texts that are frequently ungrammatical and often difficult to comprehend; and the 
Department effectively distances itself from the information provided in a disclaimer at the 
foot of the page. Although developments in the software may overcome some of the 
problems of such translation work, I see the larger problem as being one that fails to 
recognize the real nature and complexity of the information that is being communicated and 
the mechanization of human communication that underlies such initiatives. It is an un-
nuanced and unsophisticated view of human communication that devalues not only the work 
of professional interpreters and translators, but also the texts being communicated and the 
audience receiving them. Such solutions are obviously much cheaper that professional work 
and so the ideologies that underlie the mechanizing of cross language communication support 
a powerful neoliberal agenda in government services. 
 
Hale: This is really alarming. These solutions may seem cheaper on the surface, but they 
mask the many problems miscommunication can cause, which almost always translate into 
higher costs. I hope we can do something to convince this department to change its practices. 
As the new president of the national professional association AUSIT, I will put it on our 
agenda! 
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